Neverside

3. The Immutability-vs.-Omniscience Argument
This argument is based on an alleged incompatibility between attributes (b) and (e) on our list. It, too, comes in different versions, one of which is the following:[5]

1. If God exists, then he is immutable.
2. If God exists, then he is omniscient.
3. An immutable being cannot know different things at different times.
4. To be omniscient, a being would need to know propositions about the past and future.
5. But what is past and what is future keep changing.
6. Thus, in order to know propositions about the past and future, a being would need to know different things at different times (from 5).
7. It follows that, to be omniscient, a being would need to know different things at different times (from 4 and 6).
8. Hence, it is impossible for an immutable being to be omniscient (from 3 and 7).
9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and .

The usual place at which this argument is attacked is its premise 4. It is claimed that a timeless being can know everything there is to know without knowing propositions about the past and future. Consider the following two propositions as examples:

A. The origin of the planet earth is in the past.
B. The end (or destruction) of the planet earth is in the future.

The claim is that a timeless being need not know propositions A and B in order to know everything there is to know, because such a being could know the exact dates of both the origin and the end of the earth and that would suffice for complete knowledge. That is, A and B would be "covered," and so it would not be necessary for the omniscient being to know A and B in addition to those dates.

But, of course, this claim can be challenged. To know the dates of the origin and the end of the earth does not entail knowing propositions A and B. To know A and B requires being situated within time (somewhere between the origin and end of the earth), so they are not anything that a timeless being could know. However, they certainly are things that an omniscient being must know. Thus, the given objection to premise 4 of the argument above is a failure.

It should be noted that a somewhat different incompatible-properties argument could also be constructed using the divine attribute of transcendence instead of immutability. The argument would focus on the point that a transcendent being must be timeless and a timeless being cannot know propositions about the past and future. However, an omniscient being, as shown above, must know propositions about the past and future. Therefore, it is impossible for a transcendent being to be omniscient. The incompatibility would be between attributes (c) and (e) on our list. Such an argument could be called "the Transcendence-vs.-Omniscience Argument." The same issues would be raised in it as were raised, above, in connection with the Immutability-vs.-Omniscience Argument.

4. The Immutable-vs.-All-Loving Argument
Here the alleged incompatibility is between attributes (b) and (i). The argument may be expressed as follows:

1. If God exists, then he is immutable.
2. If God exists, then he is all-loving.
3. An immutable being cannot be affected by events.
4. To be all-loving, it must be possible for a being to be affected by events.
5. Hence, it is impossible for an immutable being to be all-loving (from 3 and 4).
6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

To be affected is to be changed in some way, so premise 3 is pretty much true by definition. Premise 4 might be challenged, but when the nature of love is contemplated, it is seen that 4 must also be true. The concept of love that is relevant here is that of agape, which is the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of others. If events were to call for some sacrifice on God's part, then, to be loving in the relevant sense, he must go ahead and perform the sacrifice. Since that requires being affected, the truth of premise 4 is assured.

This argument is a particularly forceful one. There is another argument which is very similar to it, which pits immutability against the property of being a person (property [g] on our list). It could be called the "Immutability-vs.-Personhood Argument." The basic idea behind it would be that in order to genuinely be a person (or personal being), it is necessary that one be capable of being affected by what happens. I think that that one, too, is quite forceful, but I shall not pursue it here. (For a similar argument, see section 6 below.) We have done quite enough with the divine attribute of immutability.

5. The Transcendence-vs.-Omnipresence Argument
Here the incompatibility is between properties (c) and (f). The argument may be formulated as follows:

1. If God exists, then he is transcendent (i.e., outside space and time).
2. If God exists, then he is omnipresent.
3. To be transcendent, a being cannot exist anywhere in space.
4. To be omnipresent, a being must exist everywhere in space.
5. Hence, it is impossible for a transcendent being to be omnipresent (from 3 and 4).
6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

The usual place at which this argument is attacked is premise 3. It is claimed that to transcend space does not entail being totally outside space. A being could be partly inside space and partly outside. Consider the Flatland analogy: a three-dimensional object transcends Flatland, and yet it exists within the Flatland dimensions (as well as outside). So, God could be like that. He exists within space (and, indeed, everywhere in space!) but he also exists outside space, the latter feature being what warrants calling him "transcendent."

My only objection here is that the Flatland analogy does not quite make the idea of transcendence intelligible. We understand perfectly well how a three-dimensional object might "transcend" Flatland while still being (partly) within it. However, this is still talking about objects in space. To try to extend the analogy so as to talk about something that is "outside space as well as within it" is unsuccessful. That is something that we are totally unable to comprehend. In the end, the very concept of transcendence that is appealed to here is incoherent. This illustrates the point that defenses against incompatible-properties arguments may very well lead to incoherence or other objections to theism.

6. The Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument
This is an even better argument for bringing out the relevant incoherence. It pits property (c) against property (g), instead of against (f):

1. If God exists, then he is transcendent (i.e., outside space and time).
2. If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).
3. If something is transcendent, then it cannot exist and perform actions within time.
4. But a person (or personal being) must exist and perform actions within time.
5. Therefore, something that is transcendent cannot be a person (or personal being) (from 3 and 4).
6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

Again, premise 3 might be challenged on the grounds that a transcendent being could be both partly inside time and partly outside time, with the latter feature being what warrants the label "transcendent." That is, God is said to perform actions within time but also to have a part or aspect that extends outside time. However, this notion of "partly inside time and partly outside" is definitely incoherent. No one has a clue what that might mean. To pursue such a line of thought might evade the charge of "incompatible properties," but it leads directly to the charge of incoherence, which is just as bad, if not worse.

Premise 4 might also be challenged. It might be said that its concept of personhood is too limited and that persons (or personal beings) could exist totally outside time. I am inclined to resist this sort of conceptual expansion. If the concept of personhood is extended that far, then it ceases to do the work that it was supposed to do, which was to make God into a more familiar figure. Furthermore, if persons (or personal beings) can exist totally outside of time, then it becomes unclear what it might mean to speak of "persons" (or "personal beings") at all. The boundaries of the class become so blurred that the concept becomes vacuous.

Closely related to the concept of personhood is the concept of being free, which is property (h) on our list. An argument similar to 6, above, one which might be called the "Transcendent-vs.-Free Argument," could be constructed, pitting property (c) against property (h). In its corresponding premise 4, the point would be made that, in order for a being to be free, it must exist and perform actions within time. Otherwise, there would be no way for any freedom to be manifested. Almost all theists, it should be noted, accept the idea that God is a free agent, and thus are inclined to say of him that he (at least occasionally) performs actions within time. If they call God "transcendent" at all, then they would aim to attack premise 3 of the arguments in question, not premise 4. Of course, as pointed out above, to attack premise 3 leads one to make incoherent statements, so such a maneuver cannot be regarded to be successful.

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If it can't be repeated, don't say it.

7. The Nonphysical-vs.-Personal Argument
Let us consider pitting property (d) against property (g). Then we get an argument which might be formulated in a very short way, as follows:

(1) If God exists, then he is nonphysical.
(2) If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).
(3) A person (or personal being) needs to be physical.
(4) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1-3).

Premise 3 has been advocated by Kai Nielsen, who wrote: "we have no understanding of 'a person' without 'a body' and it is only persons that in the last analysis can act or do things."[6] But not all nontheists would accept 3. One who does not is J. L. Mackie.[7] This argument turns on the issue of whether the idea of a "bodiless person" is consistent and coherent. That is a difficult and highly controversial issue, and I shall not pursue it here in this survey.[8]

It should be noted that the divine attribute of being nonphysical might also be taken to be incompatible with still other divine attributes, such as being free and being all-loving, which would give rise to slightly different incompatible-properties arguments. All such arguments, though, would lead into the same sort of difficult and controversial issues as does the Nonphysical-vs.-Personal Argument, and so should not be regarded to be among the most forceful of the various atheological arguments available.

8. The Omnipresence-vs.-Personhood Argument
Similar considerations arise when we pit property (f) against property (g). The argument may again be formulated in a brief way, as follows:

(1) If God exists, then he is omnipresent.
(2) If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).
(3) Whatever is omnipresent cannot be a person (or a personal being).
(4) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1-3).

The point of premise 3 is similar to that for the previous argument. When we contemplate what it means to be a person (or a personal being), we see that it conflicts with being omnipresent. What sorts of things might be omnipresent, anyway? Perhaps a gravitational field would serve as an example. They would all appear to be items in a different category from persons, so to try to assimilate them would be to commit a category mistake. Persons can no more be omnipresent than they can be odd or even (in the mathematical sense).

9. The Omniscient-vs.-Free Argument
We now come to a more complicated argument, which pits property (e) against (h). One way of formulating it is presented by Dan Barker.[9] A slightly different version may be formulated as follows:

1. If God exists, then he is omniscient.
2. If God exists, then he is free.
3. An omniscient being must know exactly what actions he will and will not do in the future.
4. If one knows that he will do an action, then it is impossible for him not to do it, and if one knows that he will not do an action, then it is impossible for him to do it.
5. Thus, whatever an omniscient being does, he must do, and whatever he does not do, he cannot do (from 3 and 4).
6. To be free requires having options open, which means having the ability to act contrary to the way one actually acts.
7. So, if one is free, then he does not have to do what he actually does, and he is able to do things that he does not actually do (from 6).
8. Hence, it is impossible for an omniscient being to be free (from 5 and 7).
9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and .

Some have denied that omniscience entails knowing all about the future. They say that omniscience only entails knowing what there is to know. But the future actions of free persons are open, and not there to be known about. Thus, not even an omniscient being could know about them. This may provide a basis for rejecting premise 3 of the argument.

This sort of objection to 3 can be attacked in many different ways. One way would be to affirm that an omniscient being would indeed need to know all about the future. All propositions about the future are either true or false, and an omniscient being, by definition, must know the truth of any proposition that is in fact true. Furthermore, theists, often following the Bible on this point, commonly attribute unrestricted knowledge of the future to God.[10] Indeed, if God does not know the future actions of any free beings, then there is very little, if any, pertaining to the future about which he can be certain. For no matter what the situation may be, there is always a chance that it will be affected by such actions.

Another way to attack the given objection is to maintain that, even if God does not know about the future actions of other free agents, he must know about his own future actions. One reason for this is that God's actions are all based on perfect justice and immutable law. There is never any caprice in them. His purposes and intentions have remained steadfast from all eternity, so anyone who totally understands God's purposes and intentions, as he himself does, would be able to infallibly predict his actions. It follows that God must know what he himself will and will not do in the future, which would establish the truth of premise 3 if it is taken to refer to God.

Premise 4 is a consequence of the definition of knowledge. If a proposition is known to be true, then it must be true and cannot be false. So, if X knows that Y will do Z, then it is impossible for Y not to do Z. And this is so even where X and Y are the same person.

Premise 6 says that a free agent can do what he doesn't do. That may sound odd at first, but when it is understood correctly, it seems correct. Suppose we identify what Y does as "act Z." Then in order for Y to be free, prior to doing Z, it must have been possible for Y to do Z and it must also have been possible for Y not to do Z. If it were not possible for Y not to do Z, then Y's doing of Z could not be regarded as a free act. Free acts are avoidable. You can't be free if you had to do the thing that you did. This seems intuitively right, though some forms of compatibilism might reject it. It is not a totally settled issue in philosophy. I leave it to the reader to ascertain whether or not premise 6 is correct. If it is, then I think the argument goes through.

10. The Justice-vs.-Mercy Argument
The last argument to be considered in this survey pits property (j) against property (k). It may be formulated as follows:

1. If God exists, then he is an all-just judge.
2. If God exists, then he is an all-merciful judge.
3. An all-just judge treats every offender with exactly the severity that he/she deserves.
4. An all-merciful judge treats every offender with less severity than he/she deserves.
5. It is impossible to treat an offender both with exactly the severity that he/she deserves and also with less severity than he/she deserves.
6. Hence, it is impossible for an all-just judge to be an all-merciful judge (from 3-5).
7. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 6).

I have heard it said by Christians that the way God judges offenders depends on whether or not they are true believers. If they are, then he is lenient with them, but if they are not, then he treats them with exactly the severity they deserve (which can be pretty bad). By this Christian way of speaking, God is said to be both an all-just and an all-merciful judge. He is all-just in giving everyone an equal opportunity to become a true believer and thereby come to receive leniency, but he is also all-merciful in that every true believer, without exception, receives mercy. This way of viewing matters would be an attack on both premise 3 and premise 4, above.

I would respond by maintaining that premises 3 and 4 come closer to capturing ordinary language than the given Christian way of speaking. According to the latter, God treats some offenders more leniently with regard to what they deserve than he does other offenders. It does not seem that such a judge would (or should) be called "all-just." And similarly, since he does not treat all offenders less severely than they deserve, he would not (and should not) be called "all-merciful" either. Instead of being both all-just and all-merciful, the Christian God, as described, would be neither.

As with many of the previous attacks on the incompatible-properties arguments, this one turns on semantical issues. In a sense, it is all a matter of semantics, for the issue of whether or not certain property ascriptions conflict with certain other property ascriptions depends very much on what exactly they mean. Theists could defend against the arguments by denying that the property terms in question mean what the proponents of the arguments claim they mean. Often such denials lead to still other difficulties for the theist. A full presentation and defense of incompatible-properties arguments should explore such implications and fully pursue the many issues, whether semantical or not. That project is beyond the scope of the present essay.

My aim was simply to survey several of the more common (and a few not so common) incompatible-properties arguments for the nonexistence of God. Just which of those arguments are sound and which of them are most effective in discussions and debates with theists are further issues that are certainly worth pursuing.

References
[1] See, especially, Theodore M. Drange, Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998).

[2] Following tradition, and for simplicity, I use the male personal pronoun for God. My apologies to anyone who finds that linguistic practice offensive.

[3] This obstacle applies to any version of the Ontological Argument.

[4] See, especially, Richard M. Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapter 2. The versions of the argument discussed by Gale are different from the one taken up in the present essay.

[5] Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, chapter 3.

[6] Kai Nielsen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 36.

[7] See J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-2.

[8] For reasons that support the incoherence of "disembodied persons," see Nonbelief and Evil, appendix E, section 2.

[9] See his Web essay "The Freewill Argument for the Nonexistence of God" at the following address: <http://www.ffrf.org/fttoday/august97/barker.html>.

[10] For a long list of biblical references to God's knowledge of the future free actions of humans, see Nonbelief and Evil, appendix B, section 2.

"Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey" was originally published in Philo and is copyright © 1998 by the Society of Humanist Philosophers.
The electronic version is copyright © 1999 Internet Infidels, Inc. with the gracious, written permission of the executive editor of Philo.

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/incompatible.html

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Also

A Perfect Being?

by Anton Thorn

Most religions, especially western religions, regard their god to be perfect, i.e., whole, entire and without flaw or error, indeed incapable of any fallibility whatsoever. This characteristic is normally asserted without a lot of reasoning as to why that must be so (apart from any reasoning as to why one should accept the claim that a god exists to begin with), but is endorsed virtually unanimously by the church (particularly in the case of Christianity).

But the deeper questions that the attribution of perfection to god evokes usually go unanswered, possibly because they go unasked. What does it mean for a being to be perfect? What would be the expected consequences of a being that can be said to be perfect? How does the attribute 'perfection' integrate with other attributes claimed to be possessed by God, such as purpose, omnipotence and omniscience? Or, does integration of these concepts even matter when it comes to defining such a being as God?

God, according to western traditions, is said to be the creator of the universe. As a creator, and as a perfect creator, would it not be expected that perfection follows from perfection? If god has all these absolute superlative traits ? omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc., would it not be corollary that whatever proceeds from this perfect being would also be perfect itself?

Perfection vs. purpose:

One of the most neglected questions in regard to religious attributions to the notion god is the matter of purpose. Christians are notorious for their constant bleating about God?s plan, or purpose. Just what this purpose is, and how the concept purpose can be legitimately integrated with the notion of an immortal, perfect being, is a mystery. Many theologians have thrown up their hands in confession to their inability to harmonize this conundrum, yet instead of questioning its validity, proceed to insist that men accept it as knowledge anyhow.

When the question of purpose is measured against the attribute perfection, however, the degree of this dilemma is amplified to its fullest extent. For generally the same reasons that the concept purpose cannot be integrated with immortality, there are serious and insurmountable problems which the apologist faces when trying to ascribe purposefulness to a perfect being. Perfection entails entirety, wholeness, the absence of lack, completeness in every sense, in every context, at all times. A perfect being is free of any privation whatsoever, and therefore lacks nothing, and, consequently, wants and needs nothing. Without need or desire, there can be no purpose. Without an appetite, whether for sustenance or for pleasure, for instance, a man has no need to eat, and therefore, eating at that time would serve no purpose. A perfect being does not have all its needs already satisfied; on the contrary, by definition, a perfect being would have no needs whatsoever to satisfy.

Christians may argue that God?s purpose is to create. However, this argument does not explain anything, but merely postpones resolving the essential problem. Why would a perfect being create anything? We already recognize that a perfect being cannot suffer need of any nature whatsoever, so to posit creation as the purpose of a perfect being is unjustified. Insofar as God, an allegedly perfect being, would be concerned, any creative activity in which it might engage itself must necessarily be without purpose, arbitrary, in a word, pointless. However, many Christians might counter that God creates for his pleasure, which infers that the satisfaction of God?s pleasure is his ultimate purpose. But this position would necessarily imply that God can enjoy pleasure, but, since he must create in order to enjoy that pleasure, that he is not perpetually satisfied, as he must act in order to make that pleasure a reality. In other words, any assertion entailing that God?s ultimate purpose is the satisfaction of his pleasure, and that God indeed acts to experience pleasure (e.g., the creation of the universe), strongly suggests that God responds to stimulus, can experience the opposite of pleasure, which is pain, and that God indeed needs pleasure. If God must act in order to enjoy pleasure, would that not mean that it would be his displeasure should he refrain from action, creative or otherwise?

Certainly there are many problems that arise when trying to reconcile the notion of a perfect being exercising any kind of purpose. While purpose presupposes an end which is yet to be achieved or to continually be achieved, an end that is either vital to the being in question, or desired by an act of volition (in the case of man), perfection strongly suggests a finality to all purpose, an end in itself. A perfect being would be a being whose ends have either already been achieved and fulfilled, or, as the case may be, a being which has never suffered need or want and therefore has never required either the pursuit or satisfaction of an end. Yet, in spite of all this, the theist maintains that his deity indeed has a purpose and that purpose is in the process of being fulfilled on a daily basis throughout the universe, and throughout the lives of human beings. We are told that this purpose is of God?s design, just as the universe is said to be God?s creation. But the assertion that a purpose or plan is in the process of being fulfilled infers that the end goal of that purpose is yet to be achieved, which is a state of imperfection, not perfection.

A Perfect Being creating Imperfection?

It is an undeniable fact that the universe is full of motion. Throughout the cosmos stars are birthing and exploding, asteroids are colliding and being pulverized, comets are disintegrating. Even on earth where there is a life supporting atmosphere, natural catastrophes are constantly reshaping the environment, ecosystems are forming and expiring, animal species are evolving and going extinct. The universe is virtually alive with self-correcting action, ever held in check by the balance of natural laws. Do these characteristics describe a perfect existence? Does this sound like a creation of a perfect being?

Essentially, the question to the theist becomes: How does imperfection arise from perfection? While it can be easily demonstrated that perfection can in fact arise from imperfection (a student achieving an A+ on a high school test should serve as adequate evidence for this), it remains to be explained how something claimed to be perfect can create something that is not perfect. If perfection is the starting point, as would be the case in theistic doctrines, especially if that state of perfection were armed with omnipotence (as Christians claim of their God), one would expect that any creative attempt that arose from that state of perfection would necessarily and unequivocally result in more perfection. Yet, the facts of reality do not support this causal chain of perpetual perfection in the least, and apologists and theologians can only grasp at additional absurdities in order to harmonize these facts with their extraordinary claims.

While the universe does offer living beings like man a suitable place for his existence, there are definitely many places quite hostile to his organism, indeed within even his own environment.

How does God?s alleged perfection conflict with his other alleged characteristics?

God is said to be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Can perfection be harmonized with each of these characteristics without incongruity?

Perfection and Omniscience?

A perfect God is said also to be omniscient by Christians. However, it is hard to see what purpose omniscience would serve for a perfect being. As already discussed, a perfect being would have need of nothing, or want of nothing. The concepts ?need? and ?want? are completely inapplicable in the case of a perfect being. So the question becomes, with respect to omniscience: why would God ? a perfect being ? have knowledge? Certainly, this knowledge could serve no purpose for God, since God as a perfect being would have no need for a purpose, and therefore no purpose to fulfill. So, such knowledge, even ?omniscience? or knowledge without method, cannot be necessary to God, since knowledge presupposes purpose, need and, indeed, imperfection. But the Christian insists that God possesses all knowledge, that God is omniscient, in fact, that God is necessarily omniscient. However, what purpose a perfect being could have for knowledge, complete or not, is not stated. This incoherence is further magnified by the claim that God would not be perfect unless he were also omniscient. Indeed, how could a perfect being be complete without complete knowledge? Herein lies the unresolvable paradox for the theist: A perfect being has no need to satisfy, and therefore has no need for knowledge, complete or otherwise, yet a perfect being cannot be said to be complete ? and therefore perfect ? without complete knowledge. By now, the arbitrary nature of the notion ?god? should be clear. This is why the priests insist that lay members accept their claims unquestioningly, for once a little critical thought is applied to their assertions, their arbitrary nature is easily discovered. The commandment "Believe, or go to hell," is nothing more than an attempt to intimidate any man who would dare use his own mind.

Certainly these and many other questions would have to be addressed if the theologians of the world intend to offer a coherent idea of their alleged deity.

Anton Thorn
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Sparta/1019/perfectbeing/perfectbeing.html

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Ah, good essay. I only found the argument of the thread in another forum, this gives a deeper insight into the arguments. We had some discussion about premise 3, indeed. Thank you for this overview on the additional arguments!

It is always quite difficult to apply these arguments however, as often god-images are very indefinite and change constantly, even within a single discussion, or the discussion is begun without a clear understanding what is meant by "god"...

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Quote:

we know that something perfect cannot create something imperfect by definition. If something perfect actually aims at creating a certain possible thing, this will be created perfectly. Thus, something perfect does not create something imperfect. Of course the perfect being has the ability to create what another being might consider imperfect, a shape which is not quite a circle for example. But since the perfect being intented it just like it came out, it is perfect (from the creator viewpoint)

So then you could say that "God" sees man as perfect, am I right?

edit: I will try to get to what onelife posted but, man thats long, lol.

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Quote:

Originally posted by Tool
So then you could say that "God" sees man as perfect, am I right?

Only under the given premises of the argument, under which god can't exist (meaning you're actually wrong; god can't be perfect and the creator of the universe).

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"I disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it."
- Voltaire

Also, the Bible is for the most part very specific on the definition of God, claiming several things like Katana stated. You can of course argue around it, but since what is in the Bible is definitly questionable here.
Even arguments like our uncomplete logical understanding and existance on restricted spheres are hardly valid, because the bible IS so specific, unlike Buddhism (parts at least).

Quote:

Only under the given premises of the argument

Thats all I was asking;)

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The world is my country, science is my religion. - Christiaan Huygens
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Quote:

Originally posted by Tool
Thats all I was asking;)

Of course this isn't a blank check "god doesn't exist" since for such arguments, you have to define at least parts of god... if you just use the undefined word "god" with no meaning behind it, then of course no arguments can be made.

___________________

"I disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it."
- Voltaire

Great points! I'd just like to add that if god is indeed perfect or imperfect, we would have no basis for knowing.

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